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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Search And Seizure-Was The Right Of
Privacy Taken To The Cleaners?
Police action in a murder investigation presented the Sixth
Circuit with a problem concerning the scope of the right of pri-
vacy implicit in the fourth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. During a murder investigation the police learned the
murderer had been wearing a dark suit. They also learned from ap-
pellant's wife that he had worn a dark suit on Friday, the day of
the murder. During interrogation appellant revealed he had taken
a dark suit to the cleaners on the following Monday. Based on
this information, the police contacted the manager of the cleaners
and informed him of their desire to inspect the suit. Willing to
assist, the manager sent his service manager to open the shop at
approximately 10:00 P.M. With the assistance of the service man-
ager, the police located the suit and removed it from the pre-
mises. The suit was not introduced into evidence, but an FBI
expert testified that a laboratory investigation had revealed that
present on the appellant's suit were fibers of the same type as the
victim's clothing. In the first petition for habeas corpus, appellant
challenged the legality of the search and seizure because, although
a magistrate was available, no warrant was obtained by the police
prior to their search and seizure. The circuit court reversed and
remanded in part for an evidentiary hearing on the validity of the
search and seizure.' On remand, relief was denied and appellant
appealed. 2 Held, affirmed. The warrantless search of the cleaning
shop and seizure of the suit was justified; consequently, testimony
concerning the results of the laboratory examination was properly
admitted. The laboratory examination, itself, was found not to
constitute a search; but if it had been, such a search would not
have violated appellant's fourth amendment rights. Clarke v.
Neil, 427 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1970).
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures
...has not-to put it mildly-run smooth."3
With this statement, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has character-
ized the complexities and inconsistencies involved in the interpre-
tation of the fourth amendment. A court cannot merely insert the
facts of a particular case into well-defined principles of law. Issues
I Clarke v. Henderson, 403 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1968).
2 Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1970).
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are many but standards are few. In other constitutional areas, such
as involuntary confessions, rules have been developed to assist
courts in evaluating the facts.4 In contrast, the determinations of
what establishes an unreasonable search and seizure are incongru-
ous.5 Was the search lawful? Was it reasonable? Was there pro-
bable cause? What interest does the fourth amendment protect?
These are but a few of the questions a court must answer in every
search and seizure problem, often without Supreme Court guide-
lines.
Recent decisions have begun to reduce the perplexity. No
longer does the fourth amendment protect a proprietary interest,
but rather the individuals right of privacy.8 The arbitrary line
which denied police seizure of "mere evidence" has been erased.7
The Olmstead v. United States" "trespass" doctrine, which required
physical intrusion for a fourth amendment violation, has been
overruled.9 The fourth amendment "protects people, not places"' 0
and hence, the constitutional guarantee is applied regardless of
whether there is a trespass.
Although the Supreme Court may continue to formulate a
dearer meaning to the fourth amendment, precise standards may
never be reached. By judicial interpretation, a dichotomy exists
within the fourth amendment.1 First, an individual is protected
from all unreasonable searches and seizures. 12 Secondly, no war-
rants shall be issued without probable cause.13 Though a warrant
is not needed for a lawful search, the reasonableness of the search,
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court established guide-
lines that must be followed when procuring a confession. If a party in cus-
tody is not told that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says may
be used against him, and that he is entitled to counsel, retained or appointed;
then, any testimony received may not be used in a court of law.
r See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large In The Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L
J. 319, 826 (1962).
6 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 804 (1967).
7Id. at 310. Prior to Warden, only contraband, "fruits" of the crime or
instrumentalities used in the crime were the proper subjects of an otherwise
lawful search. The Court removed the restriction of seizing "mere evidence'-
items of evidential value only.
8 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'O Id. at 351.
"'Note, Recent Fourth Amendment Developments, 29 Owo ST. L. J. 217,
217 (1968).
"2 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
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in most cases, will depend upon the procurement of a warrant. 14
Therefore, a court's review of a fourth amendment problem neces-
sitates an interpretation of "reasonable", and, in most cases, "pro-
bable." But no distinct criteria have been established by the
Supreme Court. In Ker v. California," the Court said that:
the reasonableness of a search is. . . [to be determined]
by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the
case and in light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down
by the Fourth Amendment and in opinion of this Court
applying that Amendment.
As to probable cause, the Court stated:
Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists
where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's
knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy in-
formation, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has
been or is being committed.16
The task in formulating workable standards capable of na-
tionwide application has presented countless problems.Y Yet with-
out a concrete test, it seems each court will be in the dark, inter-
preting each case separately on its own particular facts.
Apart from standards, the Mapp v. Ohio'8 decision extending
the exclusionary rule to state courts enhanced the complexities
and inconsistencies. Prior to Mapp, approximately half the states
had a similar rule, but there was no uniformity of interpretation.9
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to compel respect for con-
stitutional guaranteed rights o Deterrence of nefarious law en-
forcement is the rationale of the exclusionary rule.21 However,
its application only makes sense if in fact it does serve its purpose,
namely, the deterrence of unlawful conduct.22 The premise that the
exclusionary rule deters unlawful conduct is largely false.--, The
4This comment will not attempt to resolve the conflict as to which
clause plays the dominant role in determining the validity of the search and
seizure. For such a discussion see Note, cited in footnote 11, supra.
15374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
16 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
1r Traynor, supra note 5 at 328.
is 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19 Traynor, supra note 5 at 323.
20 E1kins v. United States, 364 US. 206, 217 (1960).
11 Traynor, supra note 5 at 884.
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local police officer is concerned with present conduct, not future
litigation. He wants to thwart the immediate unlawful conduct
rather than follow the niceties of procedure to insure a conviction.
The officer serves his community by removing the source of danger
before it results in harm. Though the want of a search warrant may
preclude a conviction, he has performed his function. The sub-
sequent loss of a conviction may upset him but probably will not
deter him from repeating his conduct.2 4 Thus, in evaluating a
search and seizure case, the court must balance the purpose of the
rule-deterrence-against the often drastic result of freeing un-
questionably guilty criminals.
2 5
Utilizing indefinite standards and the omnipresent exclusion-
ary rule the Sixth Circuit in Clark v. Neil 26 analyzed an unusual
fact situation. The admissibility of the evidence derived from the
suit depended on the legality of the search and seizure,27 which in
turn depended on whether the police had probable cause to believe
that the evidence would aid in a conviction. 8
To constitute a lawful search, a warrant is normally required.2 9
Searches conducted without prior magistrate approval are per se
unreasonable, subject only to established exceptions.30 Consent to a
warrantless search by a proper party is such an exception. 31 The
present search may be viewed as a search of the premises or of
the suit itself. If viewed as a search of the cleaning shop, as the
majority did, then it was lawful.32 The rationale of the "consent"
exception is that a person can knowingly, and intelligently waive
his constitutional protection against a warrantless search.3 3 In
the present case the manager was aware of the intentions of the
z4 Id.
25 Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No Man's Land in Criminal Law, 49
CAUF. L. Rav. 474, 487 (1961).
20 427 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1970).
27 Id. at 1323.
28 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 887 U.S. 294, 807 (1967). Al-
though the Supreme Court announced in Hayden a test to determine whether
the seizure of "mere evidence" was justified, they spoke in terms of indefinites.
2D Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30 Id. at 357. These exceptions include: search incident to a lawful arrest,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); "stop and frisk", Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) (officer may detain and "frisk", provided he has reasonable
grounds to believe that the individual is armed and dangerous); "hot pur-
suit", Warden, Md. Pentitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police may
enter premises without a warrant when in "hot pursuit" of a suspect); emer-
gency to prevent a loss of evidence, CarroU v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (warrantless search of a vehicle).
8'Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
82Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1324 (6th Cir. 1970).
S3 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 817 (1921).
1971]
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police and willingly cooperated.3 4 However, the majority also
stated that if the search were viewed as a search of the suit, it
would still not violate fourth amendment rights.a5 The dissenting
opinion felt the issue was not the validity of the manager's power
to consent, but rather the propriety of his authority to turn the
suit over to the police.-0 While the justices differed on the scope
of the search involved, both opinions recognized the right of pri-
vacy as the controlling issue. The majority considered whether the
police action invaded appellant's right of privacy,37 while the dis-
senting opinion considered whether the appellant had voluntarily
abandoned his right of privacy by placing his suit in the cleaners.3 s
Prior to Jones v. United States,39 some decisions seemed to in-
timate that the fourth amendment found its roots in property law.
40
Yet, as early as 1886 the Supreme Court recognized the fourth
amendment as essentially protecting a personal right to privacy.
1
The Court in Jones reaffirmed the privacy interest and refused to
allow the constitutional guarantee to be dependent upon the subtle
distinctions of property laws.4r Similarly, the fourth amendment
rights are not to be eroded by the law of agency. 3 The function of
the fourth amendment is to protect personal privacy against an
unwarranted invasion by the state.
4
Since the suit was voluntarily delivered to the cleaners, the in-
admissibility of this evidence is conditioned on the retention of his
privacy interest in the matter present on the suit." "What a person
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection."46 The majority felt the appellant's failure
34 Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1323 (6th Cir. 1970).
35 Id. at 1325.
38Id. at 1326 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting justice relied heavily
on the contrary wording of the district and circuit opinions. The circuit court
stated: "[w]ith the service manager's assistance the police located appellant's
suit and took it ..." However, the district judge said: "Itjhe suit was located
and freely surrended by the manager of the laundry."
37 Id. at 1325.
38Id. at 1326-27 (dissenting opinion).
30 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The Court acknowledged that to establish "stand-
ing" courts generally required the party to own or possess the siezed property.
The Court, however, overruled both standards.
4o See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
41Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). The Supreme Court
held the essence of a fourth amendment violation was not breaking down a
person's doors but the invasion of personal security, personal liberty, and pri-
vate property.
42Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
4s Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964).
44 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
45 Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1325 (6th Cir. 1970).
40 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
[Vol. 73
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to conceal the suit or anything contained thereon showed a lack of
intent to "preserve as private" the suit or the matter contained
thereon.47 However, the dissent insisted that appellant could
relinquish a quantum of privacy without relinquishing all of it.4s
The Ninth Circuit has held that a person did not surrender his
right to privacy merely by placing sealed packages in the hands of a
bailee.0 Similarly, a hotel guest retained his privacy interest against
unwarranted searches by police officers notwithstanding the hotel
manager's consent to the search.50 However, in a recent decision
the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained in a warrantless
search of a duffel bag authorized by one joint user of the bag could
be used against the non-consenting user.- This seems to indicate
that the latter had relinquished his right to privacy by allowing
another free access to the bag.
In cases in which one has allowed another access to his "ef-
fects," it seems there must have been some act other than observa-
tion by the police officers before a fourth amendment violation
could occur. This in turn would seem to necessitate some overt
act by the complaining party so that he could retain his pri-
vacy interest in the searched property. Appellant performed no
such act, as in the Corngold 2 case-sealing the packages. Yet, can
it be said that a laboratory examination is synonomous with obser-
vation? The Fourth Circuit held that a bailee's consent made a
search of an automobile reasonable, but indicated the case may
have been different had the police done more than search beyond
what was visible.63 This difference does not seem to merit a judi-
cial distinction in the present case in light of the purpose of the
fourth amendment and the facts involved. If an individual's right
to privacy is not invaded by looking at what is visibly present on
lawfully seized property, it does not seem to be any more invaded
by putting that same property under a microscope.
The legality of the seizure of appellant's suit was further pre-
dicated on probable cause criteria. Seizure of "mere evidence" is
permissible if the police have probable cause to believe the evidence
sought would aid in a conviction. 4 Probable cause is not based on
47 Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1325 (6th Cir. 1970).
48 Id. at 1326 (dissenting opinion).
49 Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966).
5 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
1 Frazier v. Cupp., 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
52Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1(th C i 6
r-SUnited States v. Eldridge, 302 F.d 463 466 (4thdr 1962).54Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
19711
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technical considerations, but on the practical considerations of
everyday life. 5 The facts and circumstances of the case determine
if a reasonable man would have acted similarly. This same court
had previously remanded to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing on probable cause.' The circuit court felt the district
court's affirmative answer was supported by the facts.57
It has been asserted that "there is no war between the constitu-
tion and common sense."' 8 Yet, an emphasis on the application of
common sense-not permitting persons to escape punishment
through application of the exclusionary rule 9 -will lead to a dilu-
tion of fourth amendment freedoms. The decision in the present
case illustrates that fact. The court has reacted to the harshness
of the result of finding a fourth amendment violation by con-
tracting the scope of privacy. An analogous situation developed
in England when numerous crimes were punishable by death.00
Faced with imposing a severe penalty for the commission of what
would today be considered a misdemeanor, the courts and juries
were likely either to acquit the offender or find him guilty of a
lesser offense.6' As a result, the public interest in punishing and
detering crime was thwarted. The same is true of the court's
decision in the present case. Rather than allow a person who is
"obviously guilty" to go free by virtue of the exclusionary rule,
the court has elected to narrow the scope of privacy. Consequently,
the penological interest of the public has been furthered at the
expense of the protection afforded by the fourth amendment.
"Common sense" would indicate that one who leaves his clothes
at the cleaners does not thereby relinquish his interest in privacy.
The court should have recognized that the search and seizure vio-
lated the fourth amendment and should have sought a solution
which was more pragmatic and less injurious to the public's in-
terest in privacy.
Dennis C. Sauter
55 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
56 Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322, 1323 (6th Cir. 1970).
57 Id. at 1324.
58 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
59 Schaefer Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1956). Justice Schaefer recognized the public's appreciation of the rules of
procedure was limited to an attitude of contempt, viewing these rules as
loopholes through which the criminal escapes. The concern with guilt or inno-
cense seems to outweigh the ideal of fair procedure.
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